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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
and the Court's January 25, 2016 order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: A trial court may reconsider any previous ruling while a case 
remains pending before it, and must do so when the trial judge determines that a 
previously assigned judge's ruling was erroneous and would affect subsequent 
proceedings. Here, Judge Harris reconsidered Judge Kennedy's previous denial 
of summary judgment to UDOT on the Arcadia Project, finding that Judge 
Kennedy erred by failing to follow the precedent set forth in Meadow Valley 
Contractors v. UDOT. Did Judge Harris have the discretion to reconsider Judge 
Kennedy's prior erroneous ruling? 
Preservation: This issue was preserved, among other places, at R. 13721. 
Judge Harris's findings of error are located at R. 16385, 16387. 
Standard of Review: Whether Judge Harris properly reconsidered Judge 
Kennedy's prior ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Red Flame v. Martinez, 
2002 UT 22, <JI 5, 996 P.2d 540; Mid-Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, 
'i{ 15,216 P.3d 352. Whether, upon reconsideration, the claim was properly 
-1-
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dismissed is reviewed for correctness. AMS Salt Indust., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
Am., 942 P.2d 315,319 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 2: A district court may dismiss an unmeritorious claim sua sponte. 
Build' s consequential damages claim is unmeritorious because the district court 
properly excluded Build' s sole witness used to present evidence of the amount of 
its damages. Did the court appropriately dismiss Build' s consequential damages 
claim because Build was unable to prove an essential element of its claim? 
Preservation: This issue was first raised at R. 7198-205, was raised again to 
Judge Harris at R. 10324-326, 10334-342, and was dealt with in oral arguments at 
R. 16292-293, 16299-304. 
Standard of Review: A district court's authority to dismiss a claim sua 
sponte is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Blazef v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 
2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 3231, 2008 WL 2932148. Whether dismissal of Build's 
claim for failure to prove an essential element was proper is reviewed for 
correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61110, 221 P.3d 219. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
Build's claims arise out of three separate construction projects known in 
this litigation as the Legacy Project, the I-215 Project, and the Arcadia Project. 
Build claims that it is owed additional payment for work performed on each 
project, either from UDOT or from Clyde-Geneva Joint Venture ("Clyde-
Geneva"), the prime contractor on the Legacy Project. (R. 194-216) Build also 
claims that UDOT' s and Clyde-Geneva's failure to pay caused it to go out of 
business, entitling it to consequential damages, or what it has sometimes referred 
to as its "business devastation" claim. (R. 201-203) 
On December 18, 2014, the district court, Hon. John Paul Kennedy 
· presiding, denied motions for summary judgment filed by all parties. (R. 9835-
41) Among the motions he denied in part was UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re: Arcadia (R. 1282-1301 ), which argued that Build' s claim was 
barred under Meadow Valley Contractors v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35,266 P.3d 671 for 
failure to provide notice as required by the contract, and UDOT' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Consequential Damages (R. 753-766), which argued in 
part that Build could not prove its claim because its lacked evidence regarding 
-3-
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the amount of damages. See Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate College, 2011 UT 
App. 37,_ <][ 16, 248 P.3d 1025 (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff 
did not disclose an expert to testify regarding damages). 
On November 25, 2015, the district court, now with Hon. Ryan Harris 
presiding, issued an Order ruling on several motions in limine. (R. 15777-786) 
Build appeals from two portions of the Order, which dismissed its claims on the 
Arcadia Project (R. 15784-85) and its claim for consequential damages. (R. 15781-
83) 
Judge Kennedy's Ruling on the Arcadia Project Claim. 
Build' s Arcadia Project claim arises out of its decision to haul excavated 
material 25 miles away from the project, rather than place it adjacent to the 
project. The Arcadia Project specifications required Build to dispose of excess 
material. They also indicate that some excess material may be placed on site 
within specific limitations, but do not indicate that all waste material could be 
disposed of on site. (R. 1285, 1342-43, 1410-14) In the spring of 2006, Tom Jessup 
of Build and Rex Harrison of Borrocks Engineering (Duchesne County's 
consulting engineer) jointly determined that all potential fill areas under the 
specifications had been exhausted and that further material would need to be 
-4-
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disposed of off-site. (R. 1286-89, 1348, 1393) Harrison did not issue a written 
change order under Specification 0725, part 1.6-he did not believe the waste 
removal constituted a change to the work. (R. 4423) Although Build now claims a 
"sudden change" occurred in 2006, it provided no notice of the alleged change 
until November 2007 after all excess material was removed. (R. 1289) Build's 
contract required it to provide written notice of any "alleged change" within five 
days of the change. (R. 1288-89) 
UDOT moved for summary judgment on the Arcadia claims on multiple 
theories. Among them was that Build's claim constituted an "alleged change," 
and Build waived its claim by failure to give notice of the change within five 
days, as required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the identical contract 
language in Meadow Valley. (R. 1292-95) 
Judge Kennedy denied UDOT's motion, reasoning that Build's breach of 
contract claim on the Arcadia Project was "subject to questions of fact, including 
whether UDOT breached its contract with Plaintiff, whether UDOT waived the 
notice provision and whether Plaintiff's claims satisfy the requirements of the 
Changed Conditions Clause of the contract specifications." (R. 9837). Judge 
Kennedy did not elaborate regarding what he viewed as questions of fact. 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moreover, Judge Kennedy's Order did not address UDOT's argument under 
Meadow Valley. 
Judge Kennedy's Ruling on Consequential Damages. 
Build asserts that it sustained consequential damages because, as a result 
of UDOT' s failure to make extra payments on each of the three projects, Build 
was forced out of business.1 (R. 178-80) This claim is plagued by factual 
problems not before this Court. What is at issue here is whether Build should be 
allowed to maintain its claim despite having no evidence of the amount of 
damages. Build failed to provide a computation of its claimed consequential 
damages in its initial disclosures (R. 14583-85), and never supplemented its 
disclosures until after Judge Harris dismissed its claim. (R. 15790-91) Build' s 
president, Fred Stromness, testified in his deposition that Build was relying on 
the testimony of its expert, Joan Whitacre, to establish its consequential damages 
claim. (R. 10453) But Whitacre testified in her deposition that she had not 
calculated, and had no opinion regarding, the amount of damages or the value of 
1 Build asserts for the first time on appeal that, in addition to the value of its business, it also 
claims attorneys' fees under a third-party tort rule theory as a component of its consequential 
damages. Because this argument is raised for the first time on appeal, the Court need not 
address it. However, even if the Court finds that Build may be entitled to recover its 
attorneys' fees, the consequential damages claim directly addressed in Build's pleadings, the 
motion for summary judgment, and the motion to exclude witnesses, and that Judge Harris 
ultimately dismissed, is the value loss of Build's business. That claim should remain 
dismissed. 
-6-
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Build's business at any time. (R. 771-75) Stromness then repeatedly refused to 
answer questions about Build's value in his continued deposition.2 (R. 15305-340) 
UDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that Build could not prove 
its damages because it had provided no evidence of the value of its business at 
any relevant time, and therefore no evidence of the amount of its loss. (R. 750-66) 
Judge Kennedy denied this motion, ruling that Build "presented evidence - most 
notably in the form of Joan Whitacre's expert opinion-that supports its 
consequential damages claim." (R. 9839) 
Judge Harris Takes Over the Case 
Judge Kennedy retired shortly after denying UDOT's motions. Judge 
Harris took over the case. On April 29, 2015 he held a scheduling conference. (R. 
16070-116) At that hearing, the court set two separate deadlines for motions-one 
for the motions that were potentially dispositive of claims, which would 
dramatically reduce the trial, and a second for additional motions in limine right 
before the trial. (R. 10284) The Court also set a nine-week jury trial. Id. 
2 The deposition continued on August 5, 2014, prior to the hearing before Judge Kennedy, 
but after briefing of the motions was completed. (R. 14615) Consequently, issues arising 
from the second deposition were not addressed. 
-7-
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Judge Harris' s Ruling on UDOT' s Motion for Clarification Re: Arcadia 
In the first round of motions, UDOT filed a motion entitled UDOT' s 
Motion for Ruling and Clarification on Legal Issues Not Yet Addressed or Ruled 
Upon Regarding UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on Build's Claims 
Concerning the Arcadia Project (the II Arcadia Motion"). (R. 11622-638) There, 
UDOT argued that Judge Kennedy did not address the dispositive precedent in 
Meadow Valley that barred Build's claim. (R. 11630-34) Build objected to the 
Arcadia Motion by asserting that it was "nothing more than a groundless motion 
for reconsideration it would have never brought before Judge Kennedy." (R. 
13696) UDOT responded that it sought a ruling on unresolved legal issues 
pursuant to Rule 56(d), Utah R. Civ. P., and that in any event, Judge Harris had 
the discretion to reconsider the prior ruling under Rule 54(b) regardless of how 
UDOT's motion was captioned. (R. 14666-672) 
At the hearing, Build moved to strike UDOT1s Legacy and Arcadia 
motions on the basis that they were motions to reconsider under Rule 54(b ), an~ 
that Build had no opportunity to address that issue in the briefing. (R. 16127) 
Judge Harris heard Build's argument, and on_questioning, Build admitted as 
follows: 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court: Okay. So why don't I have the same authorization? Sitting now 
in Judge Kennedy's seat? ... I may not want to exercise it, but I want- I 
want to make sure I understand what you're telling me. Are you telling me 
that I don't have the discretion to examine these issues again? 
Mr. Trout: I'm not saying that at all, you certainly have that discretion. The 
case law is clear on that. 
(R. 16135) 
The court then ruled that it would reconsider arguments made to Judge 
Kennedy, stating: 
I have the discretion to do this and I intend to exercise it here in this case 
today .... 
I certainly appreciate the arguments being made [by Build] and I recognize 
that the defendants are, to a large degree and in some instances, the 
plaintiffs, too, are asking me to reconsider things Judge Kennedy decided. 
But I intend to listen to the parties today and - and may very well, 
depending on how the arguments go, I may very well end up making 
some changes to some things Judge Kennedy decided. I'm going to - I'm 
not going to simply reject those arguments simply because they've been 
made before. I'm convinced there's at least some issues I ought to listen to 
today. 
(R. 16142-43) 
It is clear from the above that Judge Harris took the Arcadia Motion as a 
motion to reconsider. He concluded that he had discretion to consider the 
motion, and found that he would use that discretion where appropriate. (R. 
16143) 
-9-
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Vi9. 
Judge Harris concluded that the Supreme Court precedent in Meadow 
Valley was not properly applied, and dismissed Build' s claim on that basis: 
I'm given a little bit of pause by [Build's] argument that Judge Kennedy 
heard all of this, he was the judge, the trial judge in Meadow Valley and he 
probably should have caught this if it was an error to be caught. I'm 
mindful of that, but I don't understand how-how he distinguished 
Meadow Valley. He didn't explain and I can't- I can't get there. 
(R. 16387) 
Judge Harris's Dismissal of Build's Consequential Damages Claim. 
UDOT also filed its Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony by Fred 
Stromness and Joan Whitacre Regarding Build's Value and/or Lost Profits as a 
Result of Build' s Claim for Business Devastation ("Motion to Exclude"). (R. 
10323-43) UDOT argued that neither Stromness nor Whitacre should be allowed 
to testify to the amount of Build's consequential damages. (R. 10334-36) 
Whitacre, Build' s retained expert, should be so limited because her report 
contains no opinion of the amount of Build's damages. (R. 10341-42) Build 
conceded this point, despite the fact that Judge Kennedy's previous denial of 
summary judgment turned on Whitacre's testimony. (R. 12968) Accordingly, the 
district court precluded Whitacre from testifying to the amount of Build's 
consequential damages. (R. 15781-82) 
-10-
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Stromness' s testimony is also properly excluded. While a knowledgeable 
business owner may testify to the value of his or her business, UDOT argued that 
Stromness should not be allowed to give such testimony. (R. 10334-40) First, in 
his second deposition, Stromness admitted that he did not have the knowledge 
or experience to answer questions regarding Build' s value. (R. 14617) Second, 
Build failed to disclose at any time during fact and expert discovery any 
computation of its consequential damages, and in fact worked to preclude UDOT 
from obtaining such a computation. (R. 14420-40) The following timeline 
demonstrates the progression of discovery regarding the amount of Build' s 
consequential damages claim: 
• August 17, 2012-Build serves its initial disclosures. Those disclosures 
indicate that Fred Stromness had "direct personal knowledge of and 
understanding of ... the business devastation claim of Build." (R. 290-91) 
Build also provides the following statement regarding its calculation of 
damages for its business devastation claim: 
Build suffered business devastation damages, including but not limited to 
loss of future business opportunities, cash flow, and bonding and 
borrowing capacity .... The amount of such business devastation is being 
calculated, but is not yet complete. This initial disclosure will be timely 
supplemented upon completion of such calculation. Upon information and 
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belief, Build asserts that this damage figure will exceed the sum of 
$5,000,000.00 
(R. 14584-85) (emphasis added) 
• April 2, 2013- Build submits the expert report of Joan Whitacre, which 
includes no damages computation. (R. 10344-55) 
• July 30, 2013- UDOT takes the deposition of Fred Stromness. Regarding 
Build' s consequential damages claim, Stromness testified as follows: 
Q: And the business devastation claim, is that based upon Joan Whitacre's 
report? 
A: It is. 
(R. 10453) 
• July 31, 2013-fact discovery closes. 
• August 20, 2013-UDOT takes the deposition of Joan Whitacre. Whitacre 
testified in pertinent part as follows: 
Q: And is your report suggesting that Build has been damaged in the 
amount of $15.4 million as a result of the nonpayment of the amounts 
they're claiming in this lawsuit? 
A: There wasn't anywhere in my report where I computed damages. 
Q: So your computation of that amount is not intended by you to be a 
representation of a damage amount? 
A: It is not. 
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(R. 10363) 
Q: Are you offering an expert opinion at all as to the value of Build at any 
point in time? 
A: I am not. 
(R. 10365) 
Q: And I think you testified today, you're not expressing any expert 
opinion in this matter about the valuation of Build over any period of time 
either? 
A: I am not. 
Q: And you're not-you've never been asked to testify about any claim for 
business devastation? 
A: I have not. 
Q: You're not expressing any expert opinion about any business 
devastation claim? 
A: I am not. 
(R. 7720) (emphasis added) 
• September 30, 2013- UDOT filed its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Build' s Consequential Damages Claim. (R. 750) 
• December 13, 2013-Build filed its opposition to that motion, including the 
Declaration of Freddie Stromness. (R. 3636-643) In that declaration, as filed, 
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Stromness states in the last paragraph that "Build' s economic enterprise 
value as of Dec. 31, 2006, falls in the range of $15MM to $15.SMM." (R. 
3642) The declaration contains no other statement regarding Build' s value 
at any point.3 
• December 13, 2013. Build claims to have intended to file the Declaration of 
Freddie Stromness Regarding Build, Inc.'s Value. In that declaration, 
which was first received by counsel for UDOT on August 25, 2015, 
Stromness values Build at $15MM to $15.SMM as of December 31, 2006. (R. 
12984-90, 12992-93) 
• August 5, 2014-Stromness's deposition continues. During the deposition, 
Stromness testified: 
Q: ... My understanding is you have got an expert who has gone through 
to try and analyze the business devastation claim. Is that right? 
A: I am aware that Ms. Whitaker [sic] has undertaken that task. 
3 Build later indicated that it inadvertently failed to file a second declaration on December 
13, 2013 where Stromness stated Build's present value at $140,000, and that the signature 
pages of the two declarations were also switched by mistake. UDOT does not dispute that 
Build's error was inadvertent. (R. 12978-91) However, UDOT did not receive the second 
declaration until August 25, 2015-long after all discovery on this case was completed, and 
long after any party would have any opportunity to question Stromness on his conclusions. 
Moreover, Stromness's second deposition contradicts his declarations because, there, he 
testified that he was unqualified to answer questions regarding calculation of Build's business 
devastation damages. (R. 15322-23) 
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Q: You haven't undertaken the task to go through the books and records of 
Build, Inc. to· try to analyze or come up with a damage calculation for any 
business devastation claim? 
MR. TROUT: I'm going to object to the form of that question. 
THE WITNESS: My knowledge, my education, my experience does not 
give me the understanding. My experience does not give me the 
understanding I perceive I need to answer your_ question, sir. 
I know that Ms. Whitaker [sic] undertook to create -undertook to create a 
report, but its depth, its breadth -
Q: Have you done any analysis of the books and records of Build, Inc. to 
make a determination as to what damages Build, Inc. sustained by reason 
of the business devastation? 
MR. TROUT: I'm going to object to the form and instruct the witness not to 
answer. You are now moving into an area that's post the deposition that 
was conducted by UDOT, which Mr. Wilson attended. And I'm going to 
instruct him not to answer. 
Q: Are you going to testify at trial as to any damages sustained by Build, 
Inc. by reason of the business devastation? 
MR. TROUT: I'm going to instruct the witness not to answer.that question. 
That's a strategic decision between he and his attorney in this matter. It's 
privileged. He is instructed not to answer. 
Q: As of this date, Mr. Stromness, have you made any analysis of any 
quantification of any damages sustained by Build, Inc. by reason of what 
you claim to be a business devastation by Clyde-Geneva? 
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lv1R. TROUT: Object. Same instruction. You are not allowed to answer that 
question. 
Q: What amount of damages is Build seeking for business devastation 
against Clyde-Geneva and UDOT in this proceeding? 
MR. TROUT: Object to the form of the question. It's been asked and 
answered. The witness is instructed not to answer. 
(R. 15322-23, 15331-32) 4 
• On August 25, 2015, counsel for UDOT first received the Declaration of 
Fred Stromness Regarding Build, Inc.'s Value, in which Stromness sets out his 
method for calculating Build's value at $15MM-$15.5MM on December 31, 2006. 
(R. 12984-90) The same day, UDOT also received for the first time the correct last 
page of Stromness' s declaration regarding consequential damages, which states 
that Build's post-liquidation value is $140,000. (R. 13002) 
4 The trial court found, as a basis for its sanction, that Build was "way out of bounds" in its 
instructions to Stromness not to answer deposition questions. (R. 16252) Counsel instructed 
Mr. Stromness not to answer questions by Clyde Geneva's counsel at least 25 times. (R. 
15306, 15312, 15317, 15319, 15323, 15326-28, 15331-33, 15337, 15339) Counsel also 
prohibited any questions by UDOT or Clyde-Geneva regarding a declaration that Stromness 
issued after fact discovery was over, which contradicted his prior deposition testimony. (R. 
15339) 
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At the hearing of this Motion, the district court centered its analysis and 
questioning on Bµild' s failure to ever provide a computation of its consequential 
damages. The court pointedly asked: 
The Court: What is your computation? You know, we're way past all 
discovery deadlines, I think it's fair for these guys to ask and it's - and I'm 
asking you now: What's your damages computation? What number are 
you going to have somebody give to the jury that they should award you 
on this business devastation claim? 
Mr. Fetzer: It's going to be based on that $50 million (sic) evaluation and 
$140,000 years later, in other words, the business has been devastated, the 
value of that business is gone. Somewhere in between -
The Court: ... What is the number? 
Mr. Fetzer: I don't have that number as I stand here today .... Have we 
disclosed that number? And the answer is no. 
(R. 16272-73) (emphasis added). When pressed, Build admitted further that Fred 
Stromness would be Build's sole witness to testify as to the amount of damages 
sustained, despite having prevented any questioning on that topic at his 
deposition. (R. 16273-74, 16292) 
The court granted UDOT's motion, and excluded Whitacre's and 
Stromness' s testimony regarding the amount of consequential damages. (R. 
16304) The court then ruled "Mr. Stromness will not be able to talk about things 
that he hasn't already talked about. And because he hasn't already talked about 
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the damages computation and because we don't have an amount, even as we sit 
here today, I think the effect of that is - is that the dama - the business 
devastation claim will end up failing for lack of proof." (R. 16304) The court's 
written order reflected that conclusion, and dismissed the consequential 
damages claim. (R. 15781-82) 
2. Statement of the Facts. 
Duchesne County's Arcadia Project 
On May 24, 2005, Duchesne County entered into an agreement with UDOT 
to facilitate federal funding for Duchesne County's project. (R. 7664-65, 1304-
1315) 5 Duchesne County "selected Horrocks Engineers ... as their Consultant 
Project Engineer to perform Construction Engineering ... " (Id., R. 1308) 
On July 8, 2005, Duchesne County entered into a contract with Horrocks 
for construction administration on behalf of Duchesne County on Arcadia. (R. 
7665, 1357, 5584-5591,5593-5604, 1667) This agreement provides that Horrocks 
"shall be an independent contractor, and as such shall have no authority, express 
5 Build did not dispute any of the Statement of Undisputed Facts in UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Build's Arcadia Claims as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(B), 
U.R.Civ.P. (R. 7663-7671.) Accordingly, such facts are properly deemed uncontroverted. 
Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie lliding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, P24, 208 P.3d 1077. These 
"Uncontested Facts" are set forth in UDOT Reply Memorandum Regarding Build's Arcadia 
Claims at (R. 7663-7671.) Specific Uncontested Facts are cited by reference to the specific 
record page where the specific Uncontested Fact is recited. 
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or implied to bind [Duchesne County] and/or [UDOT] to any agreement, 
settlement, liability, or understanding whatsoever ... " (R. 7665, 5595, 1346) 
Horrocks assigned Rex Harrison to the Project. (R. 855) 
On July 12, 2005, UDOT entered into a contract with Build for the Arcadia 
Project. (R. 7665, 108) 
Build's Failure to Give Notice of its Claim 
Build seeks recovery of costs for off-site disposal of materials, specifically 
costs to "haul excess excavated clay material fro~ the pr9ject site to the 
Duchesne County Dump.'' R. 00109. Build considered this to be a "sudden 
change" in the spring of 2006. (R. 3454) 
. Build failed to provide any notice of this alleged change or extra work 
until November 20, 2007, after the hauling of material was completed. (R. 1352-
1355, 5378, 5626-27) 
Specification 725, Part 1.5 addresses "Adjustments to contract 
prices ... due to the claimed change" and Part 1.6 similarly "adjusts the Contract, 
excluding anticipated profits, if the alterations ... significantly change the 
character of the work. .. " (R.7783-85) 
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Part 1.6 addresses "knowing and deliberate" changes by the Engineer, see 
Meadow Valley 2011 UT 35, Cf[ 32, and provides that "The Engineer reserves the 
right at any time during the work to make written changes in quantities and 
alterations in the work that are necessary to satisfactorily complete the project." 
Part l._6 also requires the parties to "Agree upon the basis for Contract 
adjustment before beginning work." (R. 7784-85, 7669) 
Part 1.5, addresses "alleged changes" and provides: 
A. Promptly notify the Engineer in writing of alleged changes to the Contract 
due to differing site conditions, extra work, altered work beyond the scope 
of the Contract, or actions taken by the Department that change the 
Contract ... · 
B. Do not perform further work or incur further contract item expense 
relating to the claimed change after the date the change allegedly occurred, 
unless directed otherwise in wiring by the Engineer. 
C. Immediately notify the Engineer verbally of the alleged change or 
extra work 9ccasioned by differing site conditions or actions by the 
Department. Provide the following applicable information to the Engineer 
in writing within five calendar days of the date the change or action was 
noted ..... . Failure to provide the required notice constitutes a waiver of any and 
all claims that may arise as a result of the alleged change. Department does not 
allow adjustments to the Contract that benefit the Contractor unless the 
Contractor has provided the required notice. 
(R. 7783,7669)(Emphasis added) 
The project agreements also required "Duchesne County's 
approval. .. prior to work for all change orders" (R. 5608) and that a "[Duchesne 
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County] official shall approve all construction change orders." (R. 5589) 
Duchesne County approved change orders for other issues on its Project. (R. 
5017, 7588-92) 
Harrison did not issue a "written change" or change order under Part 1.6, 
and none was approved by Duchesne County, because Harrison did not believe 
off-site disposal was a change in the work. (R. 2826-27, 3454, 5017) 
Harrison believed that no change order was warranted for two reasons. 
First, the off-site disposal was contemplated by the specifications and was not a 
. change or extra work. Second, there was no change because off-site disposal 
could have been done at "very little additional expense to Build" (R. 2826-27, 
3454) and the material did not need to be hauled to the Landfill. (R. 7472, 7666, 
1394-1395, 2826-27, 3462, 3454) 
In the spring of 2006, Build knew that excess excavation material would be 
removed off-site. (R. 3462, 3454, 1399-1401, 5373, 1350, 10456-57, 1392-93, 7665) 
Build considered this to be a "sudden change." Specifically, Build states that 
"When Jessup left the project in the spring of 2006, he understood that due to a 
sudden change, the red clay would have to be moved off-site." (R. 3454) 
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Notwithstanding the alleged "sudden" change in the spring of 2006, Build 
never provided written notice of the alleged change until November 20, 2007. (R. 
1352-55, 5378, 5626, 7669-70) 
Build admits that "Jessup had found two landowners, the Gilberts, who 
were willing to take the red clay to fill in a gully, and that a belly scraper would 
have moved the red-clay with very little additional expense to Build." (R. 3454) 
With respect to its failure to give notice, "Build understood that it would incur 
little expense in moving the excess excavation material to an adjacent site." (R. 
3462) 
Although Build considered off-site disposal to be a "sudden change," 
Harrison disagreed. (R. 5013, 2826-27, 7667): 
I did not consider Build's hauling of the extra material from the project site to the 
County dump to constitute change involving extra work as there was no change of 
contract plans or specification by actions they were undertaking. 
(R. 5013) 6 Harrison states that "From the onset, we knew there was a surplus of 
excavation material that came off the project." (R. 1348-49) 
6 Build asserts that UDOT did not cite this testimony of Rex Harrison until the Motion to 
Reconsider. However, this specific paragraph of the Harrison Declaration was cited in 
UDOT's Memorandum in Opposition to Build Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
December 17, 2013. (R. 4423). 
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On June 30, 2008, Harrison wrote to Build explaining in detail his 
interpretation of the contract specifications, and found "no substantial change to 
the original defined work ... " He also denied Build' s alleged change order 
because "the additional costs incurred by Build, Inc .... were 'unneeded', or 
unnecessary ... " because Build could have disposed of the material "50 to 80 
yards to the West" on adjacent property. (R. 02826-27) It is undisputed that Build 
could have disposed of the material on the adjacent Gilbert property. (R. 7472, 
7666, 1394-1395, 2826-27, 3462, 3454) Build admits this could have been done 
"with very little additional expense to Build." (R. 3454, 3462) 
Build seeks recovery of "costs to haul the material to the dump." (R. 109) 
However, Harrison did not instruct Build to take the material to the Landfill, (R. 
7733, 1352, 7668-69., 5013), and expected that Build would dispose of the material 
on the Gilbert property. (R. 5014) Harrison did not learn of the hauling to the 
Landfill until after it had commenced. (R. 5016) 
Build' s explains that one reason it gave no notice of the alleged change was 
that Build accepted Harrison's interpretation that off-site disposal was Build's 
responsibility. (R. 1419, 1436, 7670, 1463, 1429, 1432-36, 12040-47) Build also 
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argues gave no notice was because it could dispose of the material on the 
adjacent property "With very little additional expense to Build." (R. 3454, 3462) 
Build also alleged below that Harrison was mistaken in his interpretation 
of the plans and specifications (R. 858), acknowledging that Harrison did not 
believe the off-site disposal was a change or extra work. 
On October 7, 2008, Harrison again expressed his disagreement with 
Build's position that "specifications do not require export of material." (R. 1418) 
Harrison also asserted that Build failed to give the required notice of a change. 
(R. 1418) 
Harrison's belief that no change occurred continued in an October 28, 2008 
meeting with Build to discuss whether "removal of the materials constituted a 
changed condition and whether Build notified UDOT to allow UDOT the 
opportunity to evaluate and monitor the work." (R. 12040) 
Stromness's January 23, 2009 letter to Build acknowledged this continuing 
dispute regarding Harrison's position that off-site disposal was not a change or 
extra work. (R. 12038) 
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Off-Site Disposal Did Not Warrant or Justify a Change Order. 
Build seeks recovery for its 11costs to haul the material to the dump." (R. 
109) However, Harrison did not instruct Build to take the material to the Landfill. 
(R. 1352, 7668-69, 1446-47) This was Build's decision. Build was never told it 
could not dispose of the material on the adjacent property. (R. 5013-16, 7733) 
Harrison was unaware that Build was hauling material to the Landfill until after 
the hauling started. (R. 5016) 
Jessup understood that an environmental clearance was needed to place 
material on the Gilbert property and started the process to obtain the clearance. 
(1402-1405) This requirement is found in Section 01355, Part 1.9.A. (R. 1328) 
Harrison expected that Build would simply obtain the required clearance to 
dispose of the material on the Gilbert property. (R. 5014) Build could have easily 
obtained the required clearance. (R. 7 472) 
Paul Adams continued as Build's Project Manager after Jessup left 
Arcadia. (R. 1404) 7 On May 3, 2006, Harrison sent an email to Adams suggesting 
two environmental consultant firms that could assist Build with the 
environmental clearance for the Gilbert property. (R. 7668, 5373, 1350, 10456-57) 
7 Build subsequently discovered that Paul Adams had taken kick-back payments from other 
Build subcontractors. (R. 7669, 10456-57) 
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As of May 14, 2007, a full year later, Build had not obtained the environmental 
clearance. Harrison sent an email to Adams indicating the critical need for Build 
to provide the documentation needed for clearance of the Gilbert site. (1440-41, 
1426-31, 1349, 7668) In r_epeated meetings with Horrocks and Duchesne County, 
Adams was asked about the status of efforts to obtain the clearance. Adams' 
responded that he was taking care of it and not to worry about it. (R. 5016, 1350) 
Build never submitted the required information for the clearance for the 
Gilbert property. (R. 5013) Rather than take this simple step, Build decided to 
haul the material twenty-five miles to the Landfill. (R. 5014-15, 7668) Build's 
decision made no s~nse to Duchesne County and further inquiry was made to 
Adams why Build did not use the Gilbert property. Adams again responded that 
it was Build's issue and not theirs and not to worry about it. (R. 5016) Harrison 
asked Adams why Build was hauling to the Landfill. Adam's similarly 
responded that "he was in charge and he could do what he wanted with it." (R. 
1347-51, 1354, 1443, 7668) 
Bryce Gilbert, owner of the adjacent property, also asked Build' s foreman 
why Build was trucking the material away rather than placing it on his property. 
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Build' s foreman responded that Build' s office did not get the paperwork done for 
clearance to place the dirt on the Gilbert property. (R. 7496) 
Build's Asserted Issues of Fact 
Build asserts six items of evidence as fact issues. However, none of this 
evidence is· material to Harrison's mental state and belief that off-site disposal 
was not a change. Build' s six items are discussed below: 
Build Issue 1: Language in contract indicating that 'Jill slopes may be 
flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess m~terial." Applt. Br. 32. 
Build Issue 2: Language in contract indicating how much excavation material 
would be disposed of at various locations within the project site. Applt. Br. 
32. 
These contract provisions do not contradict the fact that Harrison's belief was 
that off-site disposal was not a change or extra work. Harrison cites these 
provisions as support for his belief. 
On June 30, 2008, Harrison wrote to Build explaining his interpretation of the 
contract provisions and found "no substantial change to the original defined 
work ... " (R. 02826-27) Harrison cites the specification in support of his belief: 
A change order is warranted only when a significant change to the 
character of work is imposed on [Build] .... Section 02316, 1.1.C requires 
[Build] to dispose of excavated material in embankment and/or other 
areas. Section 1.7.B requires [Build] to waste excess excavated material as 
required. Section 3.5.D requires [Build] to excavate and waste unsuitable 
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material. Plan Note No. 2 on sheet No. RD-1, 2, 3, & 4 provides for possible 
waste areas along roadway by slope flattening .... 
I also looked at what conditions have changed that warrant a Change 
Order. Item No. 21 Roadway Excavation (plan quantity) was bid at 115,710 
CY as summarized on sheet no. SM-3, where the various earthwork totals 
are presented .... The plan sheets as noted in your letter RD-1, 2 & 3 do 
state by Note No. 2, a location for waste of the excess excavated material. 
This action was completed and approved by myself or our Field Engineer 
within the project right-of-way as long as it did not create drainage 
problems. To summarize, I find no substantial change to the original 
defined work for Item No. 21 Roadway Excavation. 
(R. 02826-27) 
These items cited by Build are partial recitations of Note 2 on the 
"Topography and Roadway Plan" which Harrison believes limits placement of 
fill on-site: 
Fill slopes may be flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess 
material. Fill slopes may be placed up to a 10:1 slope with the new toe of 
slope at least 10 feet from proposed R/W Line. 
(R. 3455, 854, 7666)( emphasis added) Harrison testified that the plans do not state 
that a~l excavation materials would be placed on site. (R. 5563-67, 1331, 7006) 
Build admits that the plans only "delineate the 'area of possible slope flattening' 
pursuant to Note 2." (R. 3455) Jessup testified that." ... we were to the point when 
we needed to move the· red clay ... off-site." (R. 1393) 
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Harrison further supports his belief there was no change by reference to 
the contract provisions: 
The mtent was not to dispose of all the excess materials within the limits of 
the project boundaries. The plans note that there would be 19,875 c.y. of 
excess material to be wasted per the plans and specifications. The plans 
per Note #2 of the roadway drawings allow waste within the project site in 
compliance with Specification Section 02231, 3.4. The earthwork summary 
included in the plans reflects the anticipated cuts and fill quantities and 
reflects that there would be excess "waste" excavation. 
The Arcadia Project plans, Sheet SM-3 include the Earthwork Summary 
which show the cuts and fills on the project and estimated 19,875 cubic 
yards of "waste" excavation. The Earthwork Summary, Note 1, provide 
that the contractor "waste all excess material per the plans and 
specifications." 
The plans for the Arcadia Project do not say that all excavated material, or 
soils from the cut, would be disposed on the project site. The specifications 
and plan sheets indicate that excavation material "may" be placed within 
the project limits if applicable criteria regarding slope angle, slope stability, 
drainage and other requirements were met. The plans make no indication 
or suggestion that the Arcadia Project was a balanced site or that all 
excavation materials could be placed on site. 
(R. 5012, 7666, 1267-71, 1343) 
Build' s characterization of the specifications is not material to whether 
Harrison thought off-site disposal was a change-it ~erely illustrates that 
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Harrison's belief was different from Build's view. If Harrison was mistaken, this 
confirms the existence of an "alleged change" requiring notice per Part 1.5. 
Build Issue 3: Harri.son testimony that !~the contractor was allowed to 
dispose of excavated material in waste areas" within the project site. 
A pplt. Br. 32. 
This is an incomplete statement of Harrison's testimony. Harrison actually 
stated that "the contractor was allowed to dispose of excavated material in waste 
areas along the roadway, as provided for in plan note number 2" (R. 3456) and that 
only "possible slope flattening pursuant to Note 2" was contemplated. (R. 3455-
56) None of this contradicts the fact that Harrison believed there was no change. 
In fact, Harrison cites these s~e circumstances in support of his belief that Note 
2 limits on-site fill and his conclusion that off-site disposal was not a change. (R. 
5012, 1267-71, 1343,7670,7870-7874, 10463, 10468-72) 
Again, Harrison wrote to Build on June 30, 2008 stating he found "no 
substantial change to the original defined work ... " and denied Build' s alleged 
change order. R. 02826-27. 
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Build Issue 4: A change order, completed by UDOT during the Project 
indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an unstable historic 
land slide.'' And detailing the "corrective action" taken to "improve its 
stability per Geotechnical Engineerst] recommendations." Applt. Br. 33. 
Harrison was aware of these circumstances (R. 7719), and subsequently 
expressed his belief that no change occurred in his June 30, 2008 letter rejecting 
Build's alleged change. (R. 02826-27) 
Prior to construction, geotechnical borings were done to monitor ground 
movement. (R. 7719) Using this data, the plans and specifications included 
provisions such as the Note No. 2 limitations that "[£]ill slopes may be placed up 
to a 10:1 slope" to create slope stability by preventing further weight from being 
placed on the soil. (Id) Harrison's cites these provisions to show that no change 
occurred. (R. 2826-27) 
Build Issue 5: Mr. Harrison's testimony that he instructed Build to haul the 
excess clay off site based upon an exercise of his "personal engineering 
judgment, along with our geotechnical recommendations" after becoming 
"aware of subsurface movement in that particular slide area." Applt. Br. 33. 
Build's characterization of Harrison's excerpted testimony does not contradict 
that Harrison believed no change or extra work occurred. Harrison believed that 
exercise of engineering judgment or approval was contemplated and did not 
change his belief that no change occurred: Harrison's June 30, 2008 letter states: 
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This action was completed and approved by myself or our Field Engineer 
within the project right-of-way as long as it did not create drainage 
problems. To summarize, I find no substantial change to the original 
defined work for Item No. 21 Roadway Excavation. 
(R. 5013; 2826-27) 
Harrison's belief that no change occurred notwithstanding exercise of 
engineering judgment is consistent with Specification 02231, Part 3.4 
contemplates that off-site disposal of materials may be required II at no additional 
cost to" UDOT. It also requires the Contractor to "Use material to widen 
embankments and flatten embankment side slopes as approved by the Engineer" 
and to "grade to drain properly at no additional cost to the Deparbnent" (R. 
5015, 5250) 
Once again, on June 30, 2008, Harrison wrote to Build reviewing the on-
site condition, the contract provisions and his engineering judgment and belief 
that no change had occurred and there was no extra work. (R. 02826-27) 
Build's Issue No. 6: A letter from Mr. Harri.son, acknowledging that a 
HchangeD" ... w~s the basis of [Build's1 claim in that [excavated material} 
could no longer be effectively disposed of within t~e contract limits." 
Applt. Br. 33. 
Build's incomplete of Harrison's November 25, 2008 letter, thirty months after 
the alleged "sudden change," is not material. (R. 5626) Build admits that its claim 
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"hinges upon whether ... [Harrison] ... believed he was ordering Build to perform 
work beyond what the contract called for when he ordered Build to haul excavated 
material off site." Applt. Br. 1 (Emphasis added). Build did not contest below that 
at the time the hauling issue arose, Harrison believed that off-site disposal was 
Build' s responsibility and not a change. (R. 7670) 
Harrison did not acknowledge that any change actually occurred. (R. 5013, 
7602, 2826-27, 7737-38) He only acknowledged that this was Build's contention. 
(R. 7602, 3511, 7737-38, 2826-27) Harrison testified that when he wrote the letter, 
he did not believe that a change had occurred. (R. 7737-38) 
In fact, Harrison's letter reaffirms rejection of Build's alleged change and that 
Build's "mismanagement of the Contractor's work contributed to excessive cost 
incurred by the Build, Inc." (R. 7718, 12049-50) Harrison denied the alleged 
change because off-site disposal could have been on the adjacent Gilbert 
property "at very little additional expense to Build." (R. 2826-27, 3454) Instead, 
Build decided to haul the material twenty-five miles to the Landfill. Thus, 
Harrison's reference to Build' s mismanagement which "contributed to excessive 
cost." (R. 7718) 
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Build' s recitation redacts Harrison's reference to the "changed condition" 
alleged by Build, which relates to Part 1.5 which requires notice of" conditions 
differing materially from those indicated in the Contract," which is exactly the 
type of "alleged change" asserted by Build. (R. 7793) 
Consequential Damages 
Build' s consequential damages claim is that it began work on the three 
subject projects around the same time and that it was not paid for extra work and 
changed conditions on each of the projects. (R. 202-03) As a result, Build claims 
that it was ultimately forced out of business in 2012, four years after completion. 
Id. 
However, Build' s consequential damages claim is suspect, and it is easy to 
see why Build may have been unable to adequately support the claim. In March 
2010, Build hired Kevin Nilsen to replace Stromness as its president and CEO. 
Mr. Nilsen testified that when he reviewed Build's business records he found 
that "there was quite a bit of cash flow" or "pretty healthy" cash flow.from 2007-
2009, the exact time period during which Build performed on the subject projects. 
(R. 7249) 
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While Build claims that UDOT reduced the amount of work that Build 
could do as a result of diminished bonding capacity, just the opposite occurred. 
From 2009 to 2010, UDOT actually increased Build's "prequalified" capacity to 
work as a direct contractor on UDOT projects by nearly 50% from $20,125,000.00 
to $30,175,000.00. (R. 7233-34) This increase lasted through July 1, 2011, long after 
the completion of the three projects. Id. 
Stromness also admitted that Build faced challenges for a number of years 
predating 2007 that led him to put the business up for sale. In fact, he had been 
looking for a potential buyer willing to make a "realistic offer" since 
approximately 2000. (R. 7311) 
In the summer of 2007, Stromness candidly stated in an email that he did 
"not quite have the mental fortitude needed to operate and manage Build in the 
new construction market as it exists." (R. 7316) Later in August 2007, he 
acknowledged that he had received two purchase offers for Build, one from 
Clyde Companies and the other from Mtn. Crane. (R. 7311) 
Eventually, Build hired Kevin Nilsen to replace Stromness as its CEO. (R. 
7176) In his deposition, Nilsen identified more than forty factors, totally 
extraneous to the actions or inactions of UDOT and ranging from millions of 
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dollars of inaccurate bids to embezzlement by a Build executive, which adversely 
affected Build' s financial standing between 2007 and its demise. (R. 7245-335) 
However, Nilsen made clear in an August 26, 2010 email that the floundering 
construction "economy was single biggest factor" driving Build' s struggles, 
stating "This recession is.the worst that I have seen in my 35 years in the 
business." (R. 7362-63) 
Considering all of the factors weighing into Build' s demise, Build should 
have disclosed a detailed computation of its losses claimed to be attributable to 
Clyde-Geneva and UDOT respectively. But it produced nothing; damages were 
still being computed. Build never supplemented. Its expert never testified as to 
the amount of its consequential damages, and its owner, Fred Stromness, was 
precluded by counsel from doing so. 
In short, as the parties were preparing for a nine-week trial and well after 
discovery had ended, the parties were still unaware of the amount of damages 
Build would seek at trial-its attorney did not even know the amount of 
damages as late as October 1, 2015. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court had the discretion to dismiss Build' s Arcadia and 
consequential damages claims, and it correctly dismissed those claims. 
Build's position that the district court cannot reconsider its prior rulings 
once a case has been reassigned is inconsistent with Utah law. Instead, a district 
court may review its own interlocutory orders at any time before appeal, and 
may do so sua sponte, or at the suggestion of one of the parties. The court is 
required to reconsider its prior orders when there has been a change in law, a 
change in fact, or when the second judge believes the first judge's ruling to be in 
error. 
Here, the district court properly reconsidered and reversed its denial of 
summary judgment on Build' s Arcadia claims. The court properly exercised its 
discretion, finding that Judge Kennedy's prior ruling erroneously ignored the 
controlling precedent of Meadow Valley, properly applied that case, and 
dismissed the claim. 
Dismissal under Meadow Valley was appropriate because Build failed to 
give the contractually mandated notice of an alleged change to its contract. Build 
was only excused from this requirement if the project engineer made a knowing 
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\ill). 
and deliberate change to the contract. It is undisputed that Project Engineer Rex 
Harrison expressly believed, based on his analysis of the contract, plans, and 
specifications for the Arcadia Project, that the alleged change to Build' s work was 
not, in fact, a change. Because Harrison's subjective (and likely correct) belief is 
undisputed, the contract's notice provision must be strictly applied, and Build' s 
claims dismissed. 
The district court also properly dismissed Build' s consequential damages 
claim for lack of proof. Because of Build' s failure to disclose a computation of its 
damages with its initial disclosures and at any time before the expiration of fact 
and expert discovery, the court excluded Build' s only witness who would testify 
as to the amount of Build' s consequential damages. Because Build is required to · 
prove both the fact and the amount of its damages, and could not do so, its claim 
could not survive. 
Although no party brought a motion specifically requesting dismissal of 
the consequential damages claim, the district court had the inherent authority to 
dismiss the claim for lack of proof. Were this not so, a clearly meritless claim 
would be allowed to go to trial, wasting the time and resources of the court and 
jury, and risking prejudice to the parties against whom the claim was asserted. 
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Therefore, dismissal of the consequential damages claim, even absent a motion, 
was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly dismissed Build' s claims on the Arcadia Project 
and for consequential damages. The district court had discretion to reconsider, 
clarify, supplement, or otherwise revisit its prior rulings while the action is 
pending and prior to final judgment. The district court also had the discretion to 
dismiss meritless claims when it excluded evidence without which no claim 
could stand. The court properly applied the dispositive and controlling 
precedent in Meadow Valley which mandates dismissal of Build' s Arcadia claims. 
Because the law provides the district court the discretion to make the rulings it 
did, anci because the substance of those rulings was correct, the Court should 
affirm the district court's order. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED BUILD'S 
ARCADIA CLAIMS ON RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE BUILD 
FAILED TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF ITS CLAIMS AS 
REQUIRED BY MEADOW VALLEY. 
In its December 27, 2014 order, the district court denied UDOT's motion 
for summary judgment on the Arcadia Project, citing questions of fact. (R. 9837) 
As Build points out, UDOT later made the same arguments to Judge Harris in the 
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Arcadia Motion. (R. 11622-38) Consequently, Judge Harris noted that UDOT was 
asking him to reconsider "several of Judge Kennedy's rulings," and that he 
intended to do so where appropriate. (R. 16143) He then considered the Arcadia 
Motion, found that Judge Kennedy had erred in his application of Meadow Valley, 
and dismissed Build' s claim. (R. 16387) Judge Harris took the Arcadia Motion as 
a motion to reconsider, found error with Judge Kennedy's prior ruling, and 
properly applied the Supreme Court's holding in Meadow Valley. Therefore, his 
decision should be affirmed. 
A. Judge Harris Took the Arcadia Motion as a Motion to Reconsider. 
Judge Harris properly took the Arcadia Motion as a motion to reconsider 
Judge Kennedy's denial of summary judgment. As Build points out, "the 
substance, not caption, of a motion is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion." Trembly v. Mrs. Fileds Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270,273. 
While it is true that UDOT presented the Motion as a request for the court 
to clarify its prior ruling, and to make rulings on what UDOT viewed as 
unresolved issues, Build argued and the district court accepted that UDOT had 
in fact asked for reconsideration. Build argued at length in its opposition· 
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memorandum that the district court would violate the coordinate judge rule if it 
reconsidered Judge Kennedy's prior ruling. (R. 13695-96, 13721-23) UDOT 
responded to that argument on reply, pointing out that Rule 54(b) allowed 
reconsideration of the prior ruling, regardless of how UDOT' s motion was 
captioned. (R. 14668-72) 
At the hearing, Build made an oral motion to "dismiss both of UDOT' s 
motions with respect to Arcadia and Legacy on the grounds that we've not had 
an opportunity to address them as Rule 54 and Rule 56 motions, respectively." 
(R. 16121) The district court denied Build' s oral motion, stating that it was 
"skeptical" that Build had not had an opportunity to address UDOT's motions as 
requests for the court to reconsider "since [Build] spent significant time accusing 
them of just that." (R. 16128) The court then stated that it recognized that UDOT 
was asking it to reconsider Judge Kennedy's prior rulings, and ruled that it 
would do so where appropriate. (R. 16143) The district court's oral ruling on the 
Arcadia Motion further demonstrates that the court was reconsidering Judge 
Kennedy's prior ruling. The court stated "I'm given a little bit of pause by [the] 
argument that Judge Kennedy heard all of this .... I'm mindful of that, but I 
don't understand how-how he distinguished Meadow Valley." (R. 16387) 
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Build now argues that UDOT' s Motion was an untimely motion for 
summary judgment simply because UDOT captioned its motion as seeking 
clarification, rather than reconsideration, and the district court's written order 
expressly stated that it considered another of UDOT' s motions to ·be a motion to 
reconsider, but it was silent as to the Arcadia Motion. This argument ignores the 
entire context of the district court's ruling from the bench that it would 
reconsider issues previously decided by Judge Kennedy-including issues on 
both the Arcadia and Legacy projects. Judge Harris correctly determined the 
nature of UDOT's Motion from its content-not from its caption. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the district court can 
reconsider prior rulings sua sponte under Rule 54(b). IHC Health Services, Inc. v. 
D& K Management, Inc. 2008 UT 73, <_[27, 196 P .3d 588. Accordingly, even if UDOT 
brought a different motion-or no motion at all-Judge Harris was free to revisit 
the prior denial of summary judgment on Build' s Arcadia Project claims. He 
properly exercised his discretion to do so. 
B. The District Court Acted Within its Discretion when it Reconsidered 
its Prior Ruling. 
Build next argues that, although it is unquestionable that the district court 
would have discretion to reconsider its prior rulings so long as the same judge is 
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assigned to the case, see IHC Health Services, 2008 UT 73 at 127, it loses that · 
discretion when the case is transferred from one judge to another based on the 
"coordinate judge rule." See Aplt. Br. p. 25. This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, while several older cases have stated that one district judge ordinarily 
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal authority, many other Utah 
cases demonstrate that, as to interlocutory orders, a trial court is free to 
reconsider its prior rulings regardless of a change in judge. See Mid-America 
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, 111 216 P.3d 352. This position is in 
keeping with Rule 54 and should be upheld.8 Second, if Build' s rendition of the 
coordinate judge rule applies, the district court's order properly falls under the 
exception allowing reconsideration of erroneous prior rulings. Red Flame v. 
Martinez,2000 UT 22, <_([<.[ 4-5, 996 P.2d 540. 
i. A district court may reconsider interlocutory orders, regardless of whether 
there has been a reassignment. 
In Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, 216 P.3d 352, the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected Build' s very argument. In that case, the parties had 
entered into a settlement of most of their claims, and stated that they would 
8 Build argues that UDOT never raised this issue in the court below. This is incorrect. 
UDOT argued at length at the coordinate judge rule does not apply to this case, and that 
Rules 54 and 56 allowed the district court to rule in UDOT's favor. (R. 14666-72) Although 
UDOT now relies on additional case law, as does Build, the argument that the district court 
has discretion to reconsider its prior ruling is not new. 
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agree on the language of an amended complaint. Id. at <JI 4. After failure to agree 
on the amended complaint, and Mid America filed an action to enforce the 
parties' agreement, and to allow it to file its proposed complaint. The district 
court agreed and allowed Mid America to file its amended complaint. Id. at <][ 7. 
Mid America filed a similar, but not identical complaint, and Four-Four moved 
to strike it. Id. at<][ 8. The case was reassigned to Judge Faust, who interpreted the 
parties' agreement differently, and reversed the prior order. Id. 
On appeal, Mid America argued that Judge Faust did not have discretion 
to reverse the prior ruling. The court rejected this argument, concluding: 
Mid-America inverts the law by suggesting that law of the case doctrine 
prevents a district court from reconsidering a resolved issue. Law of the 
case does not prohibit a district court judge from revisiting a previously 
decided issue during the course of a case, regardless of whether the judge has 
changed or remained the same throughout the proceedings. Rather, 'the doctrine 
allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the 
court has ruled on them.' IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., 2008 UT 36 
<][ 26. 
2009 UT 43, <][ 11 ( emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court again made clear in McLaughlin v. Schenk that~ district 
court had the discretion to. reconsider its prior rulings-even when the case is 
reassigned-regardless of whether the criteria of the coordinate judge rule are 
met. 2013 UT 20, <][22, 299 P.3d 1139. The court held, 
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There are exceptions to the law of the case. In these situations, a judge is 
required to reassess a prior ruling. These situations are '(1) when there has 
been an intervening change of authority; (2) when new evidence has 
become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision 
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.' Mid-Am. 
Pipeline, 2009 UT 43 at <j[ 14. 
2013 UT 20 at <j[ 24 (emphasis added). Mclaughlin makes clear that a district court 
has the discretion to reconsider prior interlocutory orders, but reconsideration is 
mandatory if any of these criteria are met. Contrary to Build' s assertion, the 
above exceptions are not required before a court has discretion to reconsider. 
Build points to the Supreme Court's recent decision in USA Power, LLC v. 
Pacificorp, 2016 UT 20,372 P.3d 629, as a confirmation that Utah follows its 
interpretation-of the coordinate judge rule-opposite of that articulated in 
Mclaughlin. But USA Power is a far different case. USA Power was twice heard by 
the Supreme Court on appeal. Id. at en 25. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. Id. The case 
then went to trail, the jury found in plaintiffs' favor, and the trial court granted a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in defendants' favor, which was then 
appealed. Id. <J[<_[ 25-27. With respe~t to the discussion on the law of the case, the 
Supreme Court's analysis was focused on whether its decision in the first appeal 
was controlling as to the same issues in the second appeal. Id. <JI 36. It adopted, 
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for purposes of interpreting rulings on factual matters by appellate courts, the 
coordinate judge rule, and then concluded that the "different light" exception to 
the rule applies when a court hears the same issue after evidence has been 
presented at trial. Id. <JI 38. It did not adopt the coordinate judge rule with respect 
to a district court's interlocutory orders, and it did not overrule Mid-America, 
McLaughlin, or any of the other cases confirming a district court's discretion to 
reconsider its own interlocutory orders. 
zz. The District Court's Ruling Conforms to the Coordinate Judge Rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a district court may reconsider its 
prior rulings whether or not the case has been reassigned. However, even if the 
opposite were true, Judge Harris' s ruling still conforms to the coordinate judge 
rule. Under the rule, one district judge can properly overrule another district 
judge in the same case when "although the factual and legal posture of the case 
has not changed, it appears to the second judge that the first ruling was clearly 
erroneous and will infect the subsequent proceedings with error." Red Flame, Inc. 
v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, <_[ 5, 996 P.2d 540. Leaving aside the fact that this 
exception essentially swallows the rule-a second judge would not overrule the 
orders of the first judge if he did not believe the first judge had erred-Judge 
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Harris clearly demonstrated that he believed Judge Kennedy to be in error, and 
because that error would have resulted in an unmeritorious claim going to trial, 
it would infect the subsequent proceedings. 
The Arcadia motion argued that Judge Kennedy ignored the notice 
requirements imposed by the Supreme Court's construction of identical contract 
language under Meadow Valley. Build argued at length that Judge Kennedy had 
heard and rejected UDOT's arguments. (R. 16371) After hearing those arguments, 
Judge Harris stated, 
I've been struggling during this back and forth with the attorneys ... to try 
to figure out a way to distinguish Meadow Valley and I - at the end of the 
argument, I'm just not persuaded that there is any principal (sic) way to do 
so .... I'm given a little bit of pause by Mr. Trout's argument that Judge 
Kennedy heard all of this, he was the judge, the trial judge in Meadow 
Valley and he probably should have caught this if it was an error to be 
caught. I'm mindful of that, but I don't understand how-how he 
distinguished Meadow Valley. He didn't explain and I can't-I can't get 
there. 
(R. 16385 I 16387) 
Judge Harris concluded that Judge Kennedy had erred in his application of 
Meadow Valley, and that was the basis for his ruling. Moreover, it is beyond 
argument that such an error-which would allow an unmeritorious claim to go 
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to trial-would affect subsequent proceedings. Therefore, even under Build' s 
assertion of the coordinate judge rule, Judge Harris acted within his discretion. 
m. Build Waived its Argument that the District Court Could Not Reconsider 
its Prior Order. 
If the district court erred in reconsidering its prior order, it did so because 
Build invited the error. See, e.g. State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, <j[ 25, 282 P.3d 985 ("the 
invited error doctrine ensures that parties cannot entice the court into 
committing an error and then reap the benefit of objecting to that error on 
appeal"). At the hearing, the district court asked Build' s counsel directly whether 
it lacked the discretion to reconsider Judge Kennedy's prior orders. Build's 
response was clear: "you certainly have that discretion. The case law is clear on 
that." (R. 16135) Build should not now be allowed to argue to the contrary. 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Build's Claim for Failure to 
Give Notice as Required by the Contract. 
Build' s Arcadia claims are barred by failure to give notice per UDOT 
Specification 00725, Part 1.5. Build asserts a written change should have been 
issued under Part 1.6. However, Hartjson did not issue a change order under 
Part 1.6 because he did not believe a change or extra work occurred. 
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In Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, the Utah Supreme Court dismissed a 
contractor's claim for failure to provide notice under the identical Specification 
00725, 1.5, which provides: 
C. Immediately notify the Engineer verbally of the alleged change or extra 
work occasioned by differing site conditions or actions by the Department. 
Provide the following applicable information to the Engineer in writing 
within five calendar days of the date the change or action was noted ... 
... 6. Failure to provide the required notice constitutes a waiver of any and 
all claims that may arise as a result of the alleged change. Department does 
not allow adjustments to the Contract that benefit the Contractor unless 
the Contractor has provided the required written notice. 
Part 1.5 also required that Build "not perform further work or incur further 
contract item expense relating to the claimed change after the date the change 
allegedly occurred." Section 1.5 above is the same provision referenced as 
Section 1.7 in Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, i 5. 
In Meadow Valley, the Supreme Court held that the contractor's failure to 
give the required notice of what it viewed as a change to the contract-the 
required use of a more expensive paving method-barred its claim under this 
provision, even though UDOT had actual notice of the contractor's claim. Id. at 
<]l33. Similarly, Build alleges that the offsite disposal was a change to its contract. 
According to Build, "When Jessup left the project in the spring of 2006, he 
understood that due to a sudden change, the red clay would have to be moved 
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off-site." (R. 3454) But Build never provided written notice of the alleged change, 
as required by Specification 0725, until November 20, 2007. 
Build asserts that Part 1.6, Significant Changes in the Character of the 
Work, applies and that failure to give notice under that section does not result in 
a waiver of Build' s claims. The Meadow Valley court held that this provision only 
applies to "knowing and deliberate changes" where the person making the 
change "believed [the direction] altered the contract." Otherwise, the direction is 
an "alleged change" governed by Specification 1.5 (1.7 in Meadow Valley). 2011 
UT35, <_[26. 
Significantly, Part 1.6 is triggered by a "written change" issued by 
engineer. This never occurred because Harrison did not recognized any change. 
Part 1.6 further provides that the parties are to agree in advance to any contract 
adjustment before proceeding with the alleged change work. Neither Harrison 
nor Build took any steps to agree to any additional payment. In short, Harrison 
issued no change and took none of the steps under Part 1.6 because he did not 
believe any change occurred. There is no evidence to challenge Harrison's mental 
state and there is no evidence that Harrison made a "knowing and deliberate" 
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change or believed his actions altered the contract. Accordingly, Part 1.5 applies 
as a matter oflaw. 
Under Part 1.5, Build "waived' any and all claims that may arise as a result 
of the alleged ... change" by continuing work and failing to give notice and 
UDOT is entitled to enforce the contract's notice provision. Meadow Valley, 2011 
UT 35, <jl 33, 55. Therefore, Build is barred from asserting its claims, and dismissal 
was appropriate. 
z. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact. 
"Summary disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and necessary tool in a 
judicial system such as ours, which strives for the efficient and timely resolution 
of legal disputes." Wycalis v. Guardian· Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821,824 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)("Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a 
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules 
as a whole, that are designed to 'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action"). 
Build fails to raise any genuine issue of material fact. The material and 
dispositive fact is that Harrison believed that off-site disposal of material was not 
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a change to or alteration of the contract. Whether Harrison was mistaken in his 
belief is not material. Whether Build disagreed with Harrison's interpretation of 
the contract is not material. In fact, this ongoing dispute underscores the 
existence of an "alleged change" and not a "knowing and deliberate" change. 
The court in Meadow Valley addressed a similar argument and found, "[the 
contractor's] notice obligations were triggered, not waived, when [the engineer] 
allegedly interpreted the contract's ... specifications incorrectly." Id. at <j[ 47 
(emphasis in original). 
Rule 56( c) provides that summary judgment shall be "rendered forthwith" 
where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is not 
precluded merely because there are facts in dispute, but only when there is a 
genuine dispute as to a material fact. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 
(Utah 1980). In applying these criteria, "genuineness and materiality are not 
infinitely elastic euphemisms that may be stretched to fit whatever pererrations 
catch a litigant's fancy." Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F .3d 249, 253 
(1st Cir. Mass. 1996)(Quoting Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
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Build's interpretation of the specifications and Harrison's 
acknowledgement that some excess material may be placed on-si~e is not 
material. Harrison undisputedly believed that there is no provision in the plans 
that all material would be placed on site. No material issue of fact is presented 
regarding Build' s assertion relating to the stability of the hillside, mitigation of 
potential soil movement or that Harrison exercised engineering judgment. None 
of this contradicts the undisputed fact that Harrison subjectively believed under 
all these circumstances and inferences alleged by Build, that off-site disposal of 
material was not a change. The disputation of Harrison's belief at the time of the 
alleged change in the spring of 2006, which continues to this day, establishes 
existence of an "alleged change" requiring Build to give notice. There is simply 
no evidence to support an inference that Harrison made a "knowing and 
deliberate" change to the contract. 
Build simply asserts its own belief without any factual connection to 
Harrison's belief. Build, as a practical matter, argues that because Build views the 
"alleged change" one way, that Harrison necessarily must have believed the 
same. Such improbable inferences, unsupported speculation and brash 
conjecture are insufficient. J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney 
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lg. 
Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir. Mass. 1996). Such "speculation and 
surmise, even when coupled with effervescent optimism that something definite 
will materialize further down the line, are impuissant in the face of a properly 
documented summary judgment motion." Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. Mass. 1996). 
zz. No Change or Extra Work Occurred as a Matter of Law. 
Harrison's belief that no change occurred is legally, as well as factually 
established, even under Build' s version of the facts. Build' s changed conditions 
claim requires a showing that the alleged excess costs are "solely attributable" to 
the changed conditions. Weeks Dredging & Contr. v. United States, 13 CL Ct. 193, 
218-219 (CL Ct. 1987). Build makes no such showing. Build could have disposed 
of the material on the adjacent Gilbert property. (R. 7472, 7666, 1394-1395, 2826-
27, 3462, 3454) Build admits this could have been done at "very little additional 
expense to Build." (R. 3462) 
A changed conditions claim also requires a plain and positive 
representation in the contract that certain conditions would be met. Pacific Alaska 
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 436 F.2d 461 (Ct.Cl.1971). The plan sheets for 
Arcadia contain no plain and positive representation that all excavated material 
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would be placed on the project site. In fact, Build admitted below that the 
Arcadia plans only delineate the "Area of possible slope flattening" pursuant to 
Note 2. Build Fact No. 18 (Emphasis added). 
Specification 02231, Part 3.4 contemplates that off-site disposal of materials 
may be required and provides that off-site disposal "outside of the right of way" 
is to be performed "at no additional cost to the Department." 
These provisions merely suggest the possibility that Build may be able to 
waste material on site but would not necessarily be able to do so. See La Bove v. 
Am. Employers, 189 So.2d 315, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1966) ("the words 'may be' are 
used as the equivalent of possibly or by chance.")(citing State v. Howland, 110 
P.2d 801; McElroy v. Luster, 254 SW. 2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.)). 
Nowhere in the plans is there a plain and positive representation that 
Build would be able to dispose of all or even part of the excess material on site. 
Therefore, Build's alleged change claim was properly dismissed. 
Similarly, Build's change order claim is barred by its failure to mitigate its 
damages. See Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah 1987) ("It is 
a well-settled rule of the law of damages that "no party suffering a loss as the 
result of a breach of contract is entitled to any damages which could have been 
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avoided if the aggrieved party had acted in a reasonably diligent manner in 
attempting to lessen his losses as a consequence of that breach." 3 Williston on 
Sales§ 24-5, at 405 (4th ed. 1974). This doctrine is the mitigation of damages rule 
"that a party has the active duty of making reasonable exertions to render the 
injury as light as possible .... and that no recovery may be had for losses which 
the person injured might have prevented by reasonable efforts and 
expenditures." Fairfield Lease Corp. v. 717 Pharmacy, Inc., 109 Misc. 2d 1072, 441 
N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1981). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BUILD'S 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES CLAIM BECAUSE BUILD 
CANNOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF ITS 
DAMAGES. 
Build next contends that the district court erred in dismissing its 
consequential damages or ''business devastation" claim because UDOT had not 
specifically requested dismissal in its motion to exclude Build' s only witnesses in 
support of that claim. Build does not contest the propriety of ~xcluding 
testimony by its only witnesses. It merely seeks reversal based on the narrow, 
technical ground that this Court should take an extraordinary step of adopting a 
rule precluding a district court from dismissing a plainly unmeritorious claim 
without a motion. The Court sho1;1ld reject this argument. 
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A. The District Court has the Power to Dismiss Unmeritorious Claims 
Without a Motion. 
The district court has the inherent power to dismiss a meritless claim sua 
sponte under Rule 12(b)(6}, Rule 41, or simply under its own inherent power. 
Wabasha v. Smith, 956 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1992)(per curiam); Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., 
Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); Baker v. Dir. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 
725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Velasco v. Sec. Nat'l Mortg. Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065 
(D. Hi. 2011); Slangal v. Getzin, 148 F.R.D. 691,694 (D. Neb. 1992); Blazef v. 
Cleveland Clinic Found., 2008-Ohio-3814 (Ohio App. 2008); see also C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1969). 
Utah appellate cases have not directly addressed a district court's inherent 
power to dismiss an unmeritorious claim, or a claim that will fail as a result of 
the district court's exclusion of certain evidence. However, other jurisdictions 
nearly unanimously recognize that power, and several courts have affirmed sua 
sponte dismissal of a claim as a result of exclusion of evidence-as happened 
here. In Blaze!, for example, a trial court granted a motion to exclude an expert 
witness's testimony, and then as a result of its ruling, dismissed the plaintiff's 
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claim sua sponte for lack of proof. 2008-Ohio-3814, <j{ 6. Plaintiff appealed, and the 
court affirmed. The court noted that, 
A trial court may also dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, if the complaint is 
either frivolous or the pleading party clearly could not prevail on the facts 
alleged in the complaint. 
Id. at <JI<JI 8-9. 
Likewise, the federal courts are clear that "[ d]istrict courts have inherent 
authority to dismiss meritless claims sua sponte ... . " Merriweather v. Metro. Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171029 (E.D.N.Y.) (citing Fitzgerald v. First 
East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2nd Cir. 2000); Zahl v. 
Kosovsky, 471 Fed. Appx. 34, 37 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1460, 185 
L. Ed. 2d 363 (2013)). 
Furthermore, no Utah case has held that a district court cannot dismiss a 
claim sua sponte. Build certainly points to none-the only case it cites in support 
of its argument, Clifford P.D. Redekop Family LLC v. Utah Cnty. Real Estate, 2016 UT 
App 121, ciI 8, is cited only as an example of a district court granting a defendant's 
motion for summary judgment based on its prior exclusion of evidence. In fact, 
Utah case law specifically allows a district court to reconsider prior decisions sua 
sponte. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K Mngmt. Co., 2008 UT 73, <JI 27, 196 P.3d 588 
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("While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any appeal ... 
the court remains free to reconsider that decision. It may do so sua sponte ... "). 
Here, Judge Kennedy considered whether Build had admissible evidence 
supporting the amount of its consequential damages when he denied UDOT's 
motion for summary judgment. He concluded that Build did, through Joan 
Whitacre-whose testimony Judge Harris excluded. It was entirely reasonable 
for Judge Harris to reconsider that prior ruling in this instance, especially since 
he excluded the only evidence that Judge Kennedy cited to support his ruling. 
The position Build advocates creates bad policy. Build's position is that the 
district court could not dismiss its unmeritorious claim because UDOT had not 
asked it to, and UDOT can no longer move for dismissal because the dispositive 
motion deadline had passed. Therefore, the claim must go to trial even though 
Build has no evidence. Rather, Build argues that UDOT should have "filed a 
motion for directed verdict at the close of Build' s evidence at trial." Applt. Br. 37. 
But for what purpose? There is simply no reason to require the district court to 
wait until the middle of trial to dispense with such a claim. Build cannot prove 
an essential element of its claim, and allowing it to put on evidence of other 
elements of its unprovable claim would only serve to prejudice UDOT, all the 
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while wasting the jury's time and the parties' and court's resources. Build' s 
position violates the principles of judicial economy and fundamental fairness. 
B. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Build's Consequential 
Damages Claim Because Build Could Not Prove the Amount of its 
Damages. 
The district court was substantively correct to dismiss Build' s 
consequential damages claim when Build, after fact discovery had ended, had no 
evidence of the amount of its damages. It is well-settled that "[a] plaintiff is 
required to prove both the fact of damages and the amount of damages." Sleepy 
Holdings v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App. 62, 'Il 13 (quoting Stevens-Henager 
Coll. v. Eagle Gate Coll., 2011 UT App 37, 'Il 16,248 P.3d 1025. Because Build 
cannot prove the amount of its consequential damages, that claim cannot 
survive. 
This court most recently addressed the plaintiff's burden to prove the 
amount of damages in Sleepy Holdings. There, as in this case, the plaintiff's initial 
disclosures contained an incomplete and insufficient computation of damages, 
stating that "additional work will be done in assessing and computing such 
damages." 2016 UT App. 62 at <]13. Plaintiff failed to timely supplement its 
disclosure. Id. at <JI 4. Defendant moved to strike the late damages disclosure, and 
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then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted both motions, and 
this Court affirmed. Id. at 118, 29. The Court reasoned that, because the trial 
court properly excluded plaintiff from using any damages computation at trial, 
that ruling "prevents [plaintiff] from proceeding to trial.'' Id. 
Likewise, in Stevens-Henegar, this Court held that a plaintiff "has the 
burden to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the fact of damages 
and to permit the trier of fact to determine with reasonable certainty the amount 
of those damages." 2011 UT App. 37 at 116. Simply demonstrating that UDOT's 
acts caused Build's business to fail or, as the Court in Stevens-Henegar put it, 
"general malise" does not amount to recoverable damages. Id. 
Build has no record evidence to support the amount of its consequential 
damages. Counsel admitted during oral argument that "Mr. Stromness is the 
man who will be testifying about the value [ of Build' s business]" which, taken 
before and after the projects at issue, is apparently the method Build planned to 
use to prove its damages. (R. 16292) Beyond Stromness's testimony, Build has no 
evidence-no computation of damages in its' initial disclosures, no physical 
evidence, no testimony, and no expert valuation. Because the district court 
excluded Stromness-just as the trial court in Sleepy Holdings precluded plaintiff 
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from presenting evidence of the amount of its previously undisclosed damages-
the district court was correct to conclude that Build could not proceed to trial on 
that claim. 
C. Build Raises the Third-Party Tort Rule for the First Time on 
Appeal. 
Build now claims that the district court ignored a separate portion of its 
consequential damages-in addition to its $15,000,000-plus business devastation 
claim -for which it has ample evidence: attorney's fees under the third party tort 
rule. The district court did not ignore this claim; Build never raised it, or even so 
much as hinted at such a claim until it filed its appellate brief. The only portion 
of the record Build cites to demonstrate that the issue has been preserved is a 
single footnote in one of UDOT's filings, indicating that a witness attributed 
Build' s failure, in part, to mounting legal fees. Applt. Br. 3, 37, 38.9 
"It is well established that an appellate court generally will not address 
issues raised for the first time on appeal unless a party can demonstrate 
exceptional circumstances." Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 146, 123 P.3d 416 
(quoting Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, 'JI 18, 114 P. 3d 546). The Court should 
9 Even if Build had preserved its claim, it has no merit. There is no evidence demonstrating 
that UDOTs acts caused Build to be sued by Clyde-Geneva, and Build alleges no tort claims 
against either UDOT or Clyde-Geneva. 
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not entertain this argument here-as with Build's attempts to establish the 
amount of its damages, this new argument is too little, too late. Build's entire 
claim for consequential damages was couched in its "business devastation1' 
claim, and so its entire consequential damages claim was properly dismissed. 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's 
DA TED this l.9~ay of Uc 6/beL . 2016. 
STRONG & HANNI 
~tt~{ 
Spencer Brown 
Jessica J. Johnston 
Attorneys for UDOT 
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